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IDENTIFYING THE PROBABILITY OFANACCDENT OCCURRING
WITH SUSPECTED UNAPPROKED PARTS
AS A CONTRBUTmG FACTOR
Brett J. Baker

The purpose of this study was to determine if aircraft accidents and incidents, which involve Suspected Unapproved
Parts (SUPs), are a major threat to aviation safety. In order to make this determination, the study sought to establish
the probability of such an event occurring. The Federal Aviation Administration's Ofice of System Safety provided
general aviation accident and incident data for the period spanning 1987 to 1999. In an attempt to provide the most
accurate results, the full sub-population was studied, and subsequently analpd using descriptivestatistics. SUPs were
found to contribute to 0.008225 mishaps every 100,000 flight hours, approximately 1,928 times less than the national
accident and incident rate of 15.8667 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. As a result, the null hypothesis was rejected
and the conclusion drawn that the probability of an accident andlor incident occurring with SUPs as either a causal or
contributory factor is unlikely.
INTRODUCTION
Aircraft parts that are not eligible for installation do
circumvent the controls set forth by the Department of
Transportation@OT) and Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), whether by inadvertent or deliberate action. The
potential for loss of life, an aircraft hull loss, or other
catastrophe, with Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUPs) as a
contributing hctor in an accident or incident must be
considered. Therefore, it is necessary that the magnitude of
the SUP problem be identified thereby allowing corrective
action to be. made by the appropriate authorities and
allowing potential users of SUPSto identify the threat.
Statement of the Problem
The danger posed by SUPs is enough to threaten a
significant economic loss to an aircraft owner or operator,
as well as jeopardizing human life. The authorities plan to
minimize this danger by "promoting the highest level of
aviation safetyby eliminatingthe potential safety risk posed
by the entry of unapproved parts in the United States
aviation community" (FAA, 1995, p. vi). The Federal
Aviation Administration began this process by defining a
SUP as any part, component, or material that is suspected
of not meeting the requirements of an approved part; that
is a "part that has received a formal Federal Aviation
Administration approval" (FAA, 1995, p. 18). In addition,
a SUP working group was formed within the FAA to
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develop a plan to address the SUP issue. Despite these
efforts, the size and extent of the SUP problem remains
unknown.
Review of Related Literature
Unapproved parts have become a cause for concern over
the past decade, yet unapproved parts have not developed
into a significant statistical factor in aircraft accident
investigations. The dangers posed by the installation and
use of unapproved parts not only threatens the US aviation
industry, but reach beyond the borders ofthe US with many
airlines in developing nations, particularly those located in
Afica and South America, "knowingly and openly
placing unapproved parts into service (Stern, 1996). The
number of unapproved parts placed in service within less
developed countries is primarily due to virtually
nonexistent legislative oversight and control of the air
transport industry in these regions. Under ideal
circumstances unapproved parts are prohibited fiom bemg
installed on an aircraft by a comprehensive network of
controls that govern the design and manuf cture of aircraft
parts within the US. Additional inspections and checks
occur between the manuhcture and the installation of the
aeronautical part by the maintenance technician who
purchases the part or selects it fiom a parts room for
installation on an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or
other component (FAA, 1995). Nonetheless, parts that are
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not eligible for installation do circumvent these controls,
whether by inadvertent or deliberate action.
History of Suspected Unapproved Parts
Although the problem of unapproved parts has come to
the publics' attention in recent years through the broadcast
media, congressional hearings and written press, the
problem has posed a potential threat to the aviation
industry for several decades. In 1957 the Flight Sakty
Foundation (FSF) warned that the "stream of parts
necessary for the maintenance and overhaul of aircraft
engines has become polluted." Wi+in the report, Joseph
Chase described the growth of the suspected unapproved
part problem. "Parts that are not airworthy, parts the source
and identityofwhich have long been lost, parts of unknown
material, fibricated by processes at variance with industry
and government specifications, have entered the channels
of trade" (Chase, 1957, p. 3). The report traced the origin
of these unapproved parts to the years that immediately
followed World War 11. This growth in SUPs was
determined to be primarily due to the vast numbers of
aircraft engines that were sold by the US Government as
surplus, and with the engine manufctuters' decision to no
longer produce or stock replacement parts for those war
time models. Following these events "many new and
genuine surplus parts had lost their identity in the process
of sale and resale, shipment and transshipment. Original
packages had been opened and destroyed. Markings had
been obliterated" (Chase, 1957, p. 4).
As these parts could not be determined to be genuine, it
became unacceptable to the US Civil Aeronautics
Administration, the forerunner of the FAA, to install these
parts in aircraft. As the supply of usable parts diminished,
the economic laws of supply and demand prevailed, driving
the price up. The price increase in parts encouraged dealers
and brokers to allow uncertified part. into the market.
Chase went on to write that "We might have forgiven the
people involved.. .they were dealing in genuine parts even
though these parts could not be identified positively as such
and so could not be used in certificated aircraft" (1957, p.
4). With business ethics weakened or destroyed, it was but
one step to modifying parts without the benefit of
engineering data, and another step to outright
counterfeiting (Chase, 1957).
In 1964, Chase again expressed concern about the
prolifkration of unapproved aircraft parts.
Many of the difficulties remain unchanged.. .they
are marked with the.. . part number ofthe original
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manufscturer and represented by the supplier as
'Surplus, New, or Serviceable.' Their record has
been anything but reassuring. Deviations fiom the
conditions represented ran the full scale fiom
honest mistakes.. .to outright h u d . (Chase, 1964,
P. 5).
He concluded the report by stating, "bogus parts continue
to be a threat to aviation sakty" (Chase, 1964, p. 8).
The problem of SUPs has not been limited to fixed wing
aircraft; it poses a significant threat to helicopters which
are especially vulnerable to substandard critical parts. The
threat to helicopters fiom SUPs predates 1980 to the US
involvement in the Vietnam War. "Many of these parts
undoubtedly came fiom the almost 6,000 helicopters
destroyed or captured in... Vietnam (Robinson, 1993, p.
1O)." Many of these SUPs would have mtered the US in the
early 1980s and may continue to be imported into the US
even today (Robinson, 1993).
Accidents Attributed To Unapproved Parts
Air travel is one of the safest modes of transport,
according to the National Safety Council (1998) and
Bureau ofTransportation Statistics (I 996). The fitalityrate
for people traveling by car, for example, was 110 times
greater than the rate for people traveling on scheduled US
airlines (National Safety Council, 1998). Despite an
outstanding safety record, the industry has experienced
accidents that can be attributed to unapproved parts.
According to Stem (1996), accidents whose cause has been
confirmed to be the result ofthe installation and subsequent
f ilure of unapproved parts in the US include: A Louisiana
crop duster, who was killed in 1992when his aircraft nosedived shortly after takeoff. Accident investigators found an
unapproved part in the propeller's pitch control unit that
had been installed by a local aircraft technician (Stern,
1996). The aircraft technician pled guilty to making M s e
statements on maintenance documents and was fined
$10,000. In the past several years, two more f t a l crashes
involvingprivate aircraft have occurred, includinga Cessna
172 that crashed on takeoff in September 1994, in
Oklahoma City, killing two people. National
Transportation Safety Board investigators found that
unapproved engine bearings led to the accident (Stern,
1996). In October 1995, another pilot was killed in
Longmont, Colorado when an unapproved propeller filed
in flight (Stern, 1996).
Outside the US the record is even more troubling. The
worst c o n h e d accident, according to a report by the

JAAER, Winter 2001

2

Baker: Identifying the Probability of an Accident Occurring with Suspect

Identifying the Probability of an Accident Occurring
Flight Safety Foundation in 1994, occurred on September
8, 1989 and involved a Convair 580 aircraft belonging to
Norway's Partnair charter airline. The aircraft on route
fkom Oslo, Norway to Hamburg, Germany disintegrated
22,000 feet over the North Sea, killing all 55 people
aboard. Norwegian investigators recovered 90% ofthe 36year-old plane and determined the cause of the accident to
be a result of counterfeit bolts, bushings, and brackets in
the aimaft's tail. A m d i n g to the Norwegian
investigating authority, the plane's tail vibrated violentlyas
the bolts came loose and fell off in mi&& (FSF, 1994).
Lawyers for the now defunct airline reportedly denied that
unapproved parts caused the crash.
Recently, airlines have become increasingly concerned
with the issues posed by unairworthy parts and their effects
on the air transportation system. American Airlines made
public a 14-pagelist, completewith serial numbers, ofparts
missing fiom the remains ofFlight 965 after it crashed near
Cali, Colombia in December 1995 (Bajak, 1996). This
public announcement is unprecedentedwithin the industry.
Parts Considered To Be A m t a b l e For Aeronautical Use
There are a number of acceptable methods for
-aeronautical parts to be designed and produced, most of
these methods require specific FAA approvals. This is
usually the case for major aircraft products such as
airfiames, engines, and propellers, as well as key
components or parts that could significantly afkct the
operation and safety of an aircraft. The FAA grants
approvals only on the basis of a stringent overview of
design criteria, facilities, processes and quality control
systems (FAA, 1995). FAA Production Approval Holders
(PAH) are subject to continual FAA surveillance and
inspection to verie their compliance with the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) and the conditions of their
approvals (FAA, 1995).
There are a number of sources of acceptable parts that are
not produced under specific FAA approvals. For example,
it is permissible for the owner or operator of an aircraft to
"produce parts for maintaining or altering that person's
own product" (FAA, 1998, p. 3). Manufkcturers often
specifLthat it is acceptable to use "standard parts," such as
nuts and bolts, for production and maintenance. Standard
parts production is not monitored by the FAA, but must
conform to specified industry accepted criteria. Standard
parts can be tested for conformity and may be used in
aeronautical products only when specified in the design
(FAA, 1998). Other parts not formally approved by the

FAA that are acceptable if used in the proper application
are parts "fabricated" by maintenance personnel in the
course of performing a repair and returning a product to
service (FAA, 1998). However, such parts are still required
to meet applicable design criteria as explained by the
following definition.
Standard Part. A part manufactured in complete
compliance with an established industry or US
government specification which includes design,
manufacturing, test and acceptance criteria, and
uniform identification requirements; or for a type
of part which the Administrator has found
demonstrates conformity based solely on meeting
performance criteria, is in complete conformance
with an established industry or US Government
specificationwhich containsperformancecriteria,
test and acceptance criteria, and uniform
identification requirements. The specifications
must include all information necessary to produce
and conform the part, and be published so that any
party may manuhcture the part. Examples include
but are not limited to, National Aerospace
Standards (NAS), ArmyMavy (AN) , Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) , SAE Sematec,
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council, Joint
Electron Tube Engineering Council, and
American National Standard Institute (ANSI)
standards. (FAA, 1998, p. 4).
In addition to regulating the design and
manufacture of aeronautical parts, the FAA regulates the
individuals and organizations that use parts. These
regulations specifi/ quality control and inspection
procedures for certificate holders such as air carriers and
repair stations, which include procedures to carefilly
inspect incoming materials and parts for authenticity and
conformity with applicable standards as outlined in
Advisory Circular (AC) 21-29B (FAA, 1998). These
controls are designed to ensure that parts that are produced
and used meet applicable design requirements, are eligible
for installation, and are appropriate for a given situation.
However, there are numerous sources of parts that do not
meet applicable requirements but do enter the aviation
system. Collectively, these parts are called "unapproved
parts".
Parts Considered To Be Unsuitable For
Aeronautical Use
The intentional installation ofunapproved parts on
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an aircraft is punishable under civil and criminal law. If
caught a person may be charged with hlsifjing statements,
committing wire fiaud, mail fiaud, and endangering the
safety of an aircraft which is punishable by h e s or prison
(FAA, 1994). To avoid the inadvertent installation of parts
considered unsuitable for aeronautical use, unapproved
parts are defined within Advisory Circular 21-29B,
Detecting and Reporting Suspected Unapproved Parts
(FAA, 1998, p. 4):
A part that does not meet the
requirements of an "apprgved part." This term
also includes parts which have been improperly
returned to service (contrary to FAR parts 43 or
145) andlor parts which may hll under one or
more of the following categories:
1) Parts shipped directly to the user by a
manuhcturer, supplier, or distributor, where
the parts were not produced under the
authority of an FAA production approval for
the part, such as production overruns where
the parts did not pass through an approved
quality control system.
2) New parts which have passed through a PAH
quality control system which are found not to
conform to the approved desigddata.
3) Parts that have been maintained, rebuilt,
altered, overhauled, or approved for return to
service by persons or Gcilities not authorized
to perform such services under FAR parts 43
and/or 145.
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4) Parts that have been maintained, rebuilt,

altered, or approved for return to service
which are subsequently found not to conform
to approved data.
5) Counterfeit parts.
A summary ofparts that may constitutean unapproved part
may be found in Table 1.
Counterfeit parts, a type of "unapproved part," may be
new parts that are deliberately misrepresented as designed
and produced under an approved system or other acceptable
method even though they were not designed and produced
under such a system. Counterfeit parts may also be used
parts that, even though they were produced under an
approved system, have reached a designed life limit or have
been damaged beyond possible repair for aviation
standards, but are altered and deliberately misrepresented
as acceptable, with the intent to mislead or dehud.
If an "approved part" is not salvageable, i.e., thought to be
worth saving under controlled conditions for potential
future repair, it is considered scrap and should be disposed
of in such a way that it cannot be returned to service.
However, if a part is salvageable, it should be "documented
and controlled so that it is not returned to aviation service
until all requirements are met." (FAA, 1995, p. 58). Both
salvageable and scrap parts are sometimes misrepresented
as having useful time left or as having been repaired in
accordance with regulations.
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Table 1
Summary of What Constitutes an Unavuroved Part
Bogus and Unarmroved Parts
*

NewParts
No Production Approval (Counterfeit and Fraudulently Manufactured Parts)
No Individual Production Approval (Current PAH Relationship-But Also Manufacture
Other Parts-PMA Issues)
Rejected Parts Sold by PAH
K

Scrav/Used Parts
Counterkit and Fraudulently Overhauled Repaired Parts
Salvaged Parts From Stolen, Scrapped or Crashed Aircraft
Military Swplus Parts (Not FAA Approved)
Inventory Exceeding Shelf Life AndIOr Unknown Origin
OwnerIOperator Produced or Modified Parts Sold by Another Party
Susvected U I ~ ~ V DParts:
~OV
The
~ Paverwork
~
Problem

I

-

New Parts
An Approved Part with Missing Paperwork
UsedParts
A Properly Repaired Part Which Was Certified But Paperwork Lost

Note. Adapted From Una~~roved
h l a n e Parts and Air Safetv, 104 Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995) (Testimony of Mary Schiavo)

Other examples of parts that are not eligible for use, or
"unapproved parts," are parts rejected during the
production process because of defects; parts for which
required documentation has been lost; parts that have not
been properly maintained, and parts fiom military aircraft
that have 'hot been shown to comply with FAA
requirements" (FAA, 1995, p. 3).
Unapproved parts also occur when a supplier, that
produces parts for an approved manufacture, directly ships
to end users without the approved manuhcturers'
authorization or a separate, applicable Parts Manufscturer
Approval (PMA). An example of this is "production
overrun" parts. These parts are not authorized by the PA&
so it cannot be assumed that they have undergone all ofthe
requirements of the approved holder's required quality
control process.
Unapproved parts have been found to be a determining
cause of several accidents and incidents involving private
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and commercial aircraft, worldwide. Unapproved parts
played a role in at least 166 US based aircraft accidents or
incidents (Bajak, 1996). Four of these accidents involved
commercial carriers that resulted in six fatalities. However,
just how many unairworthy parts have claimed lives is in
dispute. The number may be i%rgreater according to James
Frisbee, quality control chief at Northwest Airlines, "It's
very, very hard to pin the cause of an accident on a part that
has failed.. .especially when the airplane is scattered over
five acres" (Frisbee, 1995).
Parts
Official Status of Una~~roved
There have been few formal studies conducted to try and
determine the statistical probability of unapproved aircraft
parts being a contributing factor in an aircraft accident or
incident within the US. However, a rudimentary search of
the FAA accident and incident database by the Associated
Press found that unapproved parts played a role in
approximately 166 aircraft accidents or less serious
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incidents fiom May 1973 through April 1996, resulting in
17 deaths and 39 injuries (Bajak, 1996). According to
Baurngarner (1995) the FAA has received fewer than 1300
reports of SUPs since 1989; and investigations have led to
over 100 enforcement actions. Despite the low number of
SUP reports, it should be noted that each SUP report can
constitute thousands of illegal parts, for example the
grounding of 6,000 light aircraft powered by Textron
Lycoming reciprocating engines for inspection for
unapproved bolts (Baumgarner, 1995). The SUP problem
is further exemplified in a Flight, SafeQ Digest (1994)
report which stated that a US Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) audit of 12 repair stations found that of parts
sampled, "43 percent of all newly purchased parts and 95
pacent of parts purchased fiom distributors or brokers did
not have reasonable evidence of either FAA production
approval status, production origin or conformance with
established U.S. or industry specifications" (p. 1).
The literature supports the idea that regulatory control is
inadequate and the problem of SUPs is aggravated further
by the fact that the FAA does not have enough money or
inspectors to monitor the nation's 2,000 parts distributors
and brokers.
US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) do not prohibit
the sale or distribution of unapproved parts; therefore, this
problem is further exaggerated ("Bogus Parts," 1994).
Despite widespread claims that illegal parts traffic poses
a major safety threat, Schultz (1995) claims that SUPs pose
a very limited risk, and that aviation sa* statisticsappear
to remain largely unaffected by SUPs. The question
remains though, with no assessment of the risk magnitude
or the &lure consequence of a part, is this statement
unbiased? The DOTIOIG has underscored the importance
of developing or obtaining statistical information with
regards to monitoring SUPs within the aviation community
(FAA, 1995).
Although investigations of hudulent aircraft parts
launched by the DOTIOIG have led to 164 indictments and
130 convictions since 1990, such actions do not appear to
have been a deterrent. There are 26 million parts installed
on aircraft each year within the US. If only two percent of
these parts have been intentionally substituted with
counterfeit parts, as estimated by an internal 1995 FAA
audit, that leavesmore than half a million unapproved parts
installed every year (Stern, 1996).
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Summary
Despite the overwhelming view presented within the
literature, that SUPs present a danger to the nation's fleet,
not all concerned parties have acknowledged the problem.
The FAA has disputed many of the claims made by the
DOTIOIG and "contends that bogus parts have never
caused a plane to crash, and that there is no increase in the
number of bogus parts, just more reports" (Schiavo, 1997,
p. 256). The FAA has maintained the argument that "there
is no safety problem associated with undocumented parts:
there is no safety problem associated with Parts
Manufacture Approvals, and that they have never
encountered an accident caused by a counterfeit or
hudulently documentedpart9'(Air Transport World, 1994,
p. 1). However, this view differs significantly fiom those of
the Professional Airways System Specialists (PASS), a
union representing FAA engineers and electricians. In
testimony presented to Congress, PASS stated;
Unfortunately, PASS strongly believes that
aviation safety is seriously jeopardized by the
FAA's continued failure to identi@and to curtail
the use of suspected unapproved parts in our
nation's aircraft...The production of unapproved
parts is egregious and out of control. Eventually,
PASS fears that bogus parts will have a direct
adverse impact on operating safety and on the
unsuspecting flying public. (104 Cong., 1995).
Other organizationshave also conveyed that this problem
is new, that it is rapidly growing, and that it presents a
major threat, in the present or future, to aviation safety
(Schiavo, 1997). However, the FAA is unaware of any
evidence that shows that instances (of saw-related
unapproved parts being sold are substantially more
prevalent now than a few years ago (FAA, 1995).
Pressure to improve safety will continue to be placed
upon the administrative branches of Government. Political
pressure will continue to drive technically unreasonable
demands on safety regulators, and make outrageous claims
about safetyproblems, or safetyimprovements.Newspapers
and television will continue to sensationalize air safety
issues, as a result politicians can be expected to take
advantage of potential press coverage, and make demands
or claims that do not advance anything but coverage of
their own statements. Cries to "do something," regardless
of the significance of the problem or the practicality of the
proposed solution is the unfortunate result of such coverage
(Broderick, 1997). These "false alarms" result in wasted
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resources and provide instant credibility to those who
criticize air safety authorities or programs. Taken together,
these factors create a bureaucratic environment that
encourages that excessive resources be allocated to air
safety programs, resources far in excess of other similar (or
even more deserving) government programs (Broderick,
1997). They also provide a regulatory environment that
permits extraordinarily high levels of safety by imposing
systems and procedures on the aviation industry.
Statement of the Hwothesis
It is hypothesized that the probability gf an accident
andlor incident occurringwith Suspected Unapproved Parts
being a causal or contributory factor is significant.

METHOD
Subiects
Study participants consisted of aircraft that had been
involved in either an accident or incident between January
1987 and March 1999. However, physical evidence left by
the majority of these events had become intangible with
time. In addition, economic and time constraints forced the
author to rely on official accounts of each accident or
incident in order to determine what role SUPs had played,
if any. Therefore, each aircraft was represented by a fctual
accident or incident report filed as a matter of public
record. Records were limited to those that were retrievable
from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS),
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and FAA
accidentlincident databases. Additional criteria f i e r
defined the subjects; only those aircraft that could be
considered to f 11 within the classification of general
aviation were selected. For the purposes of this study,
general aviation was considered to consist of normal
category fixed wing aircraft and rotorcraft, if they had a
seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, ofnine or less,
and a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,400
pounds or less. An additional requirement was that aircraft
operating under Federal Aviation Regulation, Part 135,
(FAA, 1994) were excluded from the study. Sampling bias
was limited by avoiding aircraft activity indicators that did
not reflect differences in frequency of landing and takeoff
or route length. A means of avoiding or eliminating
sampling bias created by under reporting could not be
established.
Instrument
The instrument utilized during this study consisted of
the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), National
Transportation Safety Board (N.T.S.B.) and FAA

J M E R , Winter 2001

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2001

acciddicident databases. Data retrieved from these
databases were obtained under the Freedom of
Information act, and procured from one of two sources:
(a) a public domain database located on-line at
h~://www.asy.faa.go~/asp/asy~~~osssys.~,
and (b) cdrom edition, located at the Jack R Hunt Memorial
Library at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University,
Daytona Beach.
Reliability and validity were dependent upon the design
and content of these databases. Although varying
representations of the data were found between databases,
data elements used within this study were standardized.
The data were presented for analysis in a brief report
h a t that was divided into the following categories:
location information, aircraft i n h a t i o n , operator
information, narrative, sequence of events, findings, injury
summary, weatherlenvironmental information and pilot
information.
However, an additional measure was incorporated into
the handling of the instrument in an effort to M e r
increase the studies reliability and validity. In order fbr
narrative data to be standardized, the narrative discussion
had to be converted to a numerical value. In order to
achieve this, the level of damage for each incident andlor
accident was categorized in terms of mishap severity, as
defined within MIL-STD-882D (1997). The reliability
coefficient is considered high as the data and its subsequent
analysisdid not require subjectivity, but relied on consistent
and hctual information in order to draw a conclusion.
Desinn
The research method used within this study had to have
the ability to test a hypothesis, investigate relationships,
and describe conditions. In addition, when determining the
type of methodology to utilize in this study, the technique
for collecting data, data format, and the number of valid
subjects had to be considered to ensure both data and
method were compatible. A quantitative approach was
selected to test the hypothesis, and the focus narrowed so
that the descriptive method, outlined in the textbook
Educational Research, by Gay (1996, p.19), was used
exclusively. This provided the author the ability to test the
hypothesis that the probability of an accident andlor
incident occurring with SUPs being a causal or contributory
fgctor is significant.
Procedure
The data utilized for this study was obtained fiom the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), National
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Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and FAA
accidentlincident databases. Retrieving data fiom these
databases was made possible by the use of two separate
resources, (a) a public domain database located on-line at
http://www.asy.h.gov/asp/asyYcr~ssys.asp,and (b) cdrom edition, located at the Jack R Hunt Memorial Library
at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach.
The use of FAA Form 8120- 11,8020-2 and NTSB Form
6120.19A and 6120.4 by the authorities allows data to be
presented in a consistent and manageable form, improving
integration across databases. Howeyer, the synopsis found
within each accident and incident report could not be
interpreted consistently without translating the narrative
text into a numerical value. In order to achieve this MULSTD-882D, (1997) mishap severitycategories, were used to
d e h e the level of damage for each incident or accident.

Monthly CAI Rate
(per 100,000 flight hours)

-
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x 100,000

No. of CAI in Month

(1)

No. of Flight Hours in Month

Additional data was required to solve Equation 1, which
was not available fiom the accident and incident databases
described previously. This data was obtained fiom the FAA
Office of System Safety located on-line at
http://www.asy.h.go~/safety~analysiS!si.zip.
The use of combied accident and incident rates (per
100,000 flight hours) has the effect of making the
combined accident and incident rate an equal measure
across months. That is, despite a fluctuating number of
flight hours flown per month or number of days available
for flight within the month, the rate provides a consistent
measure across months. In addition, a twelve-month
moving average was used in order to dampen seasonal and
other fluctuations in the data. The twelve-month moving
average rate indicates the number of combined accidents
and incidents that occurred over the twelve proceeding
months divided by the total number of flight hours flown in
the preceding twelve months.
The realization that the term "significant" would have to be
further defined, prior to completing analysis of the data,
was made early in the study. What could be considered a
significant number ofaircraft:accidents or incidents, caused
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The search queries used to retrieve the data fiom these
databases utilized the following search terms: bogus parts,
unapproved parts, counterfeit parts, suspected unapproved
parts, and SUP. The records rehmed by these searches
were then screenedto ensurethat they met the requirements
defined earlier in this chapter, ensuring that the desired
sample was obtained.
The data was then sorted and ranked according to date,
and mishap severity. This enabled the records to be
analyzed using descriptive statistics, as outlined in A
Proerammed Introduction To Statistics (Elzey, 1971) and
Comulete Business Statistics (Aczel, 1996). The primary
measure used to evaluate the SUP combined accident and
incident (CAI) rate was the monthly accident/incident rate,
per 100,000 flight hours, which was calculated using
Equation 1.

by SUPs? The best means of accomplishing this was
determined to be a comparison between the rate of
accidents and incidents involving SUPs and the accident
and incident rate of accidents that did not involve SUPs.
This was accomplished in terms of probability as shown in
Table 2, and was applied to the CAI rptes per 100,000
flight hours.
Once the data had been analyzed, the results were
compared to the null and alternate hypotheses. The Null
states that "the probability of an accident
hypothesis
andlor incident occurring with SUPs being a causal or
contributory factor in a mishap is significant," while the
alternate hypothesis (H,) is defined as "the probability of an
accident andlor incident occurring with SUPs being a
causal or contributory bctor is minor".

a)
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Table 2
What C ~stitutesa Significant Number of Accidents and Incidents?
Interpretation
Event is not very likely to occur
Event is more likely not to occur than to occur
Event is as likely to occur as not to occur
Event is more likely to occur than not to occur
Event is very likely to occur

E
0.00 to 0.24
0.25 to 0.49
0.50
0.5 1 to 0.74
0.75 to 1.00

m.Adapted fiom Com~leteBusiness Statistics, 1996, p. 65
t

ANALYSIS
A total of 54,184 accidents and incidents occurred within
the transportation category of general aviation between
January 1987 and March 1999 (FAA, 1999). Two sets of
data were calculated; the first providing the proportion of
accidents and incidents with SUPS as either causal or
contributory factors, in relation to the number of flight
hours flown. The first data set shall be referred to within
this narrative as CAIR(SUP). The second set of data
provides the sum of accidents and incidents per 100,000
flight hours far all accidents and incidents nationwide that
fell within the class of general aviation. This second set of
data is intended to serve as a benchmark to compare the
first set of data and was assigned the label CAIR(NAT). It
should be observed that a complete data set for the period
spanning January 1999 and March 1999was not available,
hence CAIR(NAT) for this period were not included in the
analysis of data. The size of the sample CAIR(SUP) was
147 months while the population CAIRWAT) was limited
to 144 months.
As mentioned previously, CAIR(SUP)-represents
observations made over a period of 12 and a 114 years.
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During this interval, accordingto records retrieved
fiom the ASRS, NTSB, and FAA accidentlincident
databases, initial results indicated a combination of 62
accidents and incidents. Despite having used specific
search criteria each of the 62 associated records was
screened to ensure they met the needs of the study. Of these
records, approximately half met the prerequisite
requirements defined within the methodology. Those
records that did not meet the prerequisites were not
included within the study. For example, the search term
SUP returned records containing information irrelevant to
this study, the search engine having conthe acronym
SUP and the p r e k sup used in words such as supervised,
supercharged and supply. The record attrition was
exaggerated fUrther by the lack of statistical data prior to
1987. The absence of data for this period increased the
record attrition by an additional five records. A summary of
records returned by the database search is show6 in Table
3.
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Table 3

Summarv of Record Treatment
Records
Search Criteria
Returned
Bogus Parts
8
Counterfeit Parts
3
SUP
16
Suspected Unapproved Part
3
Unapproved Part
32
Total Number of Records
I
62
Number of Usable Recordsa
'Thenumber of usable records reflects the total number of
returned records minus the record attrition.

m.

-

The data set representing CAIR(SUP) was determined to
= 0.020436) with a total of
have a mean of 0.008225
147observations and a confidence interval at the 95% level
of 0.0033. The range equaled 0.1038, while the minimum
number of combined accidents and incidents CAI per
100,000 flight hours were zero and the maximum number
shown to have occurred was 0.1038 CAI per 100,000 flight
hours. The mode and median of this data set are both equal
to zero. CAIR(SUP) is a positively skewed leptokurtic
distribution with a kurtosis value of 6.028 1 and a skewness
value of 2.53681 7.
In contrast, the data set representing CAIR(NAT) has a
mean value of 15.8667 CAI per 100,000 flight hours (SDs
= 2.8126). The number of CAIR(NAT) observations, as
mentioned previously, differs fiom that of CAIR(SUP) in
that it was limited to 144 observations. A confidence level
of 95% produced a value of 0.4633. The mode was not
applicable to this data set as each observation differed,
however the median was equal to 15.8667 CAI per 100,000
flight hours. The range equaled 14.3876, while the
minimum number of CAI per 100,000 flight hours was
8.8369 and the maximum number that occurred was
23.2245.
In addition to CAIR(SUP), the accident and/or incident
severity was determined for accidents and incidentshaving
SUPS as either a causal or contributory factor using a
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Attrition
3
1
16
1
6

32

definition ofhazard severity obtaiied&om the Department
of Defense publication, MIL-STD-882D. The review of
accident and incident severity revealed that the majority of
mishaps fell within the classificationofthe critical category
(40.74 %), and catastrophic category (37.04 %). The
catastrophic category and the critical category
are equivalent to the NTSB definition of an accident, while
the marginal category (7.41%) and the negligible category
(14.81%) in turn meet the NTSB definition an incident.
The accident and incident rate, per 100,000 flight hours,
in relation to time is presented in Figure 1. The twelvemonth moving average for each year was used to plot each
point in order to dampen seasonal, or other fluctuations in
data. Due to the logarithmic scale of Figure 1, the graph
line symbolizing CAIR(SUP) is interrupted for the periods
representing 1987to 1988,1989to 1992 and 1997to 1999.
These interruptions represent a value of zero CAI per
100,000 flight hours. The line is presented at a much larger
scale in Figure 2, and can be seen to fluctuate alternately
between 0 and 0.0 1 CAI per 100,000 flight hours with the
exception of the period that falls between 1993 and 1995
where the CAI rate increased to a maximum of 0.03337
CAI per 100,000 flight hours. The line representing
CAIR(NAT) remains relatively constant, with a very
gradual decrease after 1993. However, at no point does the
line drop below 10 CAI per 100,000 flight hours.
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Figure 2. Combined Accident and Incident Rate (SUP)
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study contrast with the majority of
views held by the popular press, trade organizations, and
government representatives presented within the review of
literature. From the data presented in the previous chapter,
one must conclude that the probability of an accident or
incident occurring, which involves SUPSas a contributing
or causal fkctor, is remote. Therefore, the null hypothesis
(&) is rejected in favor of the alternativehypothesis (H,),
which states that the probability of an accident andlor
incident occurring with SUPSbeing q causal or contributory
factor in a mishap is minimal.
The rationale for rejecting the null hypothesis centers on
the dissimilarity between CAIR(SUP) and CAIRWAT).
Given that the mean CAIR(SUP) equals 0.008225 CAI
every 100,000 flight hours, a prediction may be used to
determine when a single accident or incident may be
expected to occur by solving the unknown variable in the
followidgratio, 0.008225: 1OO,OOO= l :X. This suggests that
an accident or incident will occur with a SUP as either a
causal or a contributory fkctor every 1.21 58 X 10' flight
hours flown. In comparison, a single accident or incident
can be expected to occur within general aviation at a rate of
one accident or incident every 6,302.5 1 flight hours flown.
Note that this value is inclusive of all causal and
contributory fkctors. Given that between 1987 and 1998the
average number of hours flown by general aviation aircraft
is 2,344,407 flight hours per month it can be said that an
average of 0.19283 accidents or incidents can be attributed
to SUPS per month compared to an average of 371.98
accidents or incidents nationwide every month. These
predictions compare favorably with the actual CAI rates
presented within the previous chapter.
To summarize, the Pocket Guide to Transportation
(1998), estimatesthat the general aviation fleet consisted of
182,605 aircraft in 1995 and 187,3 12 aircraft in 1996. Of
these aircraft, 2.3140 could be expected to have been
damaged or destroyed in SUP related mishaps each year.
This accident rate is approximately 1,928 times less than
the national accident and incident rate (based on CAI per
100,000 flight hours) and therefore cannot be considered
significant, as defined within chapter two. As a result, the
alternate hypothesis was found to be favorable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this study suggest that a pilot flying eight
hours daily, in a general aviation category aircraft, would
not experience an accident or incident involving SUPSfor
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4,221.55 years. However, the same pilot under similar
conditions could expect to experience an accident or
incident, inclusive of all causal factors, within 2.19 years.
Given the vast difference in these two probabilityrates, one
must reconsider the amount of time and resources that are
currently being focused to mitigate the risks associatedwith
SUPs. Do the number of fatalities and injuries associated
with an average of 0.19283 CAI, with SUPs as a causal or
contributory factor, encountered each month within the
United States justi* the expense of implementing new
programs and regulations to curb the use of SUPs?
The author believes that a combination of existing
Federal Regulations, aircraft design philosophies (e.g.,
Maintenance Steering Group3), and standard industry
practices such as Reliability Centered Maintenance serveto
adequately reduce the risk associated with a particular SUP
component prior to its use and subsequent filure. This
assertion can be demonstrated by consideringthe following
hypothetical scenario. A repair station purchases a
hydraulic pump, which is to be installed on a light twin
aircraft. The pump serves as the primary means of
actuating the landing gear retraction and extension
mechanism. Upon receipt the part is inspected by an
authorized inspector, following the basic requirements
presented within 14 CFR Part 145, the part is then given to
an aircraft technician.
The aircraft technician is tasked with installing the
component on the aircraft, and is mandated by law to
ensure that the requirements of FAR 21.303, FAR 43.13
and FAR 145.57 are met. For the purposes of this
discussion, the probability of the authorized inspector
hiling to identi6 a SUP amongst parts received fiom a
vendor or distributor is 11100 (one SUP not correctly
identified out of every 100 SUPs). In addition, the
probability ofthemaintenancetechnicianinstalling an SUP
component, unknowingly, is 1/10 (one SUP not correctly
identified out of every 10 SUPs). Therefore, taking into
account the hypothetical probabilities, one out of every
1,000 SUP components will not have been identifiedbefore
being placed in service.
A SUP component that escapes detection during this
process has an additional chance of being discovered
during future maintenance activities. A SUP component
should be identified prior to hilure through progressive,
100 hour, and annual inspections as required by FAR 91,
Subpart E. The hypothetical probabilityofpersonnel hiling
to identi@a SUP during an inspection is 1/20 (1 SUP not

JAAER, Winter 2001

12

Baker: Identifying the Probability of an Accident Occurring with Suspect

Zdent~fiin~
the Probability of an Accident Occurring

correctly identified out of every 20). Should a SUP part
however hi1 to be removed and continue in serviceuntil the
number of cycles flown results in hilure, the redundancy of
flight critical systems is designed to prevent a catastrophic
hilure. This design philosophy helps reduce the accident
and incident rate by SUPs by apportioningrisk throughout
the system, so that a catastrophic failure is nearly
impossible. Assume that the hypothetical probability of the
hydraulic motor hiling during operation is 1/1,000 (one
hilure per 1,000 flights). The hydraulic system
incorporates a hand operated emergency hydraulic pump,
which is to be used to lower the aircrafts undercarriage
should the primary pump fail. The hypothetical failure rate
for this component, like the hydraulic motor, is 111000
flights. Under normal circumstances, the redundancy
designed into this system would have reduced the
probability of a catastrophic hilure by 1 X lo6. However,
the hydraulic motor is a counterfeit part that has been
unknowingly ininstalledon the aircraft and its failure rate is
1/10 flights. The probability of an accident or incident
occurring because of this SUP is reduced finther when the
failure rates of events upstream are calculated, that is
considering the design, maintenance and inspection
procedures. In simplistic terms, the probability of
catastrophic hilure occurring in this scenario is one in
every two billion flights. This scenario demonstrates that a
number of filters already exist to remove SUPs fiom the
system and that aircraft design philosophies and modern
maintenance practices make the likely hood of a
catastrophicsystem failure due to a SUP improbable.
There can be no doubt that SUPs have manifested
themselves as a safety problem and that SUPs can be found
within the nations' aircraft parts inventories. As there is no
conclusive evidence of the number of SUPs in these parts
inventories, with the exception of a controversial audit
conducted by the DOT/OIG (1996), the ratio of parts that
are rejected from the system and the number of SUPs
eventually installed on aircraft cannot be determined.
Although the result of this study suggest that little threat to
public safety is presented by SUPs, it is incapable of
determining the relationship between the number of SUPs
in parts inventories, and the number of SUPs installed
within the commercial and general aviation aircraft fleet.
It is therefore recommended that M e r research is
conducted to determine this ratio and its effect on the
national accident and incident rate.
It has been argued that the dangers of SUPs to airlines
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poses an even greater threat to the flying public. National
Transportation Statistics (1998) show a significantlylower
fatality rate for commercial aircraft operations, and it is
reasonable to suggest that the CAIR(SUP) rate is lower
than that of general aviation. However, due to passenger
capacity when an accident or incident does occur with
SUPs involved, the number of injuries and fatalities can be
expected to be much higher.
The public's view that airlines are more concerned with
profit than safety has played a significant role in SUP
'hysteria'. The loss of an aircraft can prove to be extremely
expensive, making it more cost effective to invest in safety
programs, additional training, etcetera. For example, the
loss of a scheduled American Airlines flight fiom Miami to
Cali, Columbia, would have meant a minimum loss of an
asset valued at 73.5 million dollars (Boeing, 1999). The
crash of the Boeing 757 required that company
representatives be flown to Columbia, requiring that
another aircraft be removed fiom revenue service, in
addition staff were accommodatedand fed at the company's
expense while the logistics of investigatingthe accident and
providing care for grieving h i l y members, immediately
a h the accident took place. In addition, the airline would
have been liable to pay $75,000 to each h i l y under the
Montreal agreement, if the airline was a signatmy,
otherwise the victims relatives would be eligible to receive
approximately $13,782 under the Warsaw convention. The
airline would also forego opportunity costs associated with
lost revenue and other miscellaneous items. Given these
unexpected expenses, it is in the best interest of the airline
to protect their fleet fiom SUPs by purchasing parts @om
credible suppliers, tracking rotables, destroying
unairworthy parts before selling them for scrap, and
following AC 2 1-29B.
The allocation of scarce resources to the SUP 'threat' can
be considered the result of mismanagement by involved
parties. Over the last ten years, 70.6% of aircraft accidents
have been caused by human factors. Logic would dictate
that the greatest reduction in the number of injuries and
fstalities could be achieved by targeting human factors, by
using those resources currently allocated to reducing SUPs
to better train flight crews, maintenance technicians and
design new technology to help eliminate human error.
Social and legal issues are in a constant state of flux, and in
recent years require that thosepersons or organizationsthat
jeopardize public safety within the aviation arena be
severely penalized. This has resulted in organizations and
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personnel beiig held liable under tort law for products or
services that have led to an accident or incident. The threat
of litigation is increased by the economic doctrines of
caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), and increasingly
caveat venditor (let the seller beware) that .provide the
buyer or seller the legal right to demand punitive and
compensatory compensation for any deficient product. In
addition, legal precedence is currently being made as a
direct result of the Value Jet Flight 592 tragedy. If this

precedence is passed into law, maintenance organizations
and their employees will be held accountable under
criminal law. Should maintenance be determined to be the
cause of an accident, corporate officers and maintenance
personnel may be indicted for criminal conspiracy and
manslaughter. These changes in social norms and law
should have the desired effect of decreasing the number of
SUPSwith the nations' parts inventories.0

Brett J. Baker earned a Master of Aeronautical Science degree and a Bachelor of Science in Aviation Maintenance
Management fiom Embry-RiddleAeronauticaI University. He holds FAA airfiame and powerplant certification and is currently
employed within the engineering department of a major airline.
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